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It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing. –
Foucault
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to share insights from a qualitative
inquiry into the lives of death-row inmates as they experience them in
a prison in the western United States, a study which has been ongoing
since 1997. In this article we briefly recount the history of prison
reform from the Renaissance to the development of the modern
supermax system, and offer a Foucaultian interpretation of that
process, an evolution which culminates in the creation of death row.
Death-sentenced prisoners in supermax face a unique set of stresses
associated with their sentence, and they have limited personal
resources with which to deal with the grimmest existence within the
American penal system. To address this grim existence, we describe
the coping skills of those on death row, and detail the phenomenon of
“tripping.” Finally, we briefly propose a Foucaultian model of that
phenomenon.
A Brief History of Punishment
Foucault’s work Discipline and Punish addresses the development
of the modern penal system (1977). He describes the significant
transformation of penal policy during the eighteenth century,
specifically the decline of public spectacles of punishment to the body
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such as torture and execution, and the rise of imprisonment (the
“carceral”) as the principal form of punishment (Foucault, 1977).
Enlightenment influences allegedly underpinned these penal reforms
(Hamilton, 1992), but Foucault maintained the liberal reformers
wanted “not to punish less but to punish better” (Foucault, 1977, p.
82). The definition of punishment did not happen in a socio-cultural
vacuum, however. According to Foucault, the penal system historically
existed for the sake of the monarchy as an exercise of power over his
subjects. The spectacle of torture and execution reminded the people
of who was in charge and the consequences of disobedience. The
practice of torture and public execution, he notes, was far from perfect
or complete. At the core of the issue was the confrontation between
the sovereign and the condemned, and the sovereign tortured the
condemned to punish him and to exercise power over the people.
Where the will of this sovereign normally covered all of his people as
the sun covers the earth, when the sovereign confronted the
condemned all of his will focused upon that point, like a magnifying
glass focusing the solar rays. As Foucault described it: “In the
excesses of torture, a whole economy of power is invested” (p. 85).
The purpose of punishment was neither re-direction nor discipline, but
revenge of the sovereign on the condemned.
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With the royal will so focused, any disturbance to the process
was also a disturbance to the royal power, for in the moment of this
power investment he could lose his power over all, and history offers
many examples of disturbances to this focus. In these cases, the
sovereign’s vengeance, in essence, could cost him power. For
example, “…the rule was that if the accused ‘held out’ and did not
confess the magistrate was forced to drop the charges. The tortured
man had then won” (p. 40), and the will of the condemned had
overcome the will of the mighty sovereign who accused him.
Therefore, Foucault noted that, “Another form of punishment was
needed: the physical confrontation between the sovereign and the
condemned man must end” (p. 73); the seeds of reform were grew
from the inadequacy of that system of punishment.
Ultimately, for Foucault, penal reform was about the rise of
another form of punishment, one that addressed the threat of crime
against an emerging propertied class. In Europe, in particular, we note
a rise in a merchant class whose financial resources became vital to
the success of a monarchy—to the point that the monarch’s power
eventually became eclipsed by the very class he grew dependent upon
(James, 2006). This propertied class gained some of the power that
once belonged only to the monarch, but the goals of the bourgeoisie
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were not served by the public spectacle of torture and execution.
Torture and execution, according to Foucault, served to demonstrate
the absolute power of the monarch and was assumed to dissuade the
crime which challenged or dissolved a portion of his power (1977). The
new propertied class, however, desired safety from crime, but at the
same time feared the arbitrary and capricious power wielded by
monarchs. With the merchants’ new power became a new focus on
punishment, a new assertion of their own power apart from the power
of the monarch.
In Foucault’s view, the newly empowered propertied class arose
from a formerly less-powerful station, and fought against the spectacle
of torture and execution of the flesh, arguing that such punishments
were ineffective or inhumane. In fact, during the eighteenth-century,
riots broke out after public executions, and monarchs found
themselves losing their control over the peoples they ruled. The
condemned himself could exacerbate the protests against public
discipline, for he could redeem himself in the eyes of the propertied
people observing the spectacle of torture and punishment: “If the
condemned man was shown to be repentant, accepting the verdict,
asking both God and man for forgiveness of his crimes, it was as if he
had come through some process of purification: he died, in his own
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way, like a saint…[T]he criminal has been almost entirely transformed
into a positive hero” (Foucault, 1977, p. 67). The increasingly
enlightened and empowered public, then, compassionately observing
the redeemed criminal, felt his humanity. In this situation, should the
monarch pursue further torture or execution, he risked alienating the
people and fomenting dissent—the very actions he sought to squelch.
The criminals, the condemned themselves, also exhibited power, a
power that the monarch must respect or risk losing his power over the
people, both law-abiding and non.”In short, penal reform was born at
the point of junction between the struggles against the super-power of
the sovereign and that against the infra-power of acquired and
tolerated illegalities” (p. 97).
With the increase in power of the propertied class and the infra-
power of these “tolerated illegalities,” the focus of the power to punish
and discipline also shifted. The new will of power was not a will of
personal offense (wherein the criminal had personally offended the
monarch or society and must be punished) but rather, a focus on
safety, normalcy, and rehabilitation. Ideologically, society pushed
away from punishment for the sake of inflicting pain and vengeance,
moving toward seeing punishment as a mechanism of forcing
conformity.
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As a result, a certain significant generality moved between the
least irregularity and the greatest crime; it was no longer the
offense, the attack upon the common interest, it was the
departure from the norm, the anomaly; it was this that haunted
the school, the court, the asylum, or the prison (p. 299).
No longer was punishment reserved for the worst cases, but
punishment of all non-conformists manifested instead on all levels of
society, from the mild offenses of delinquent children to the severe
offenses of the subversive, violent, or traitorous. The historical system
of corporal punishment simply would not do, for increasingly those in
power acknowledged the humanity of the condemned; in Foucault’s
view, non-conformity happened everywhere, and with people whose
humanity was known. A new form of punishment was needed once
those in power felt the humanity of the criminal, one that would punish
him to redeem him, to teach him, to cause his conformity. Where the
old system dehumanized the condemned, the new system treated him
as human, and preserved that humanity through successive penal
reforms. The new regime reached “… the legitimate frontier of power
to punish. Not that which must be reached in order to alter him, but
that which must be left intact in order to respect him” (p. 74). As
Foucault described it, “In the worst of murderers, there is one thing, at
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least, to be respected when one punishes: his ‘humanity’” (p. 73). The
torture and execution, the discipline and punishment against the flesh,
both objectified and dehumanized the criminal. The new power of
politics required a new, human focus for punishment.
The new punishment required a legal limit removed from the de-
humanizing torture of the past; one that ultimately spread throughout
society in the form of surveillance and discipline (Garland, 1990).
Although it is the body that is surveilled, Foucault argues that it is the
soul that requires punishment. In Foucault’s words: “A ‘soul’ inhabits
him and brings him into existence, which is itself a factor in the
mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and
instrument of political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body”
(1997, p. 30). Foucault turns the classic body/soul dualism around:
rather than the flesh containing and constraining the soul, it is the soul
that imprisons the body, constraining it, guiding its actions. Because
the soul is such an important factor, if power wishes to discipline or
punish the person, the soul must be the focus of the punishment.
Focusing on the flesh alone, in Foucault’s model, is inadequate, for it is
the soul that is autonomous, willful, and agentic. It is the soul of the
criminal that must change.
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When exercising the capacity to change souls, however, our
modern structures of power reflect the monarchs of old. Demonstrated
power over the criminal equally demonstrates power over the
populace. There becomes a “shift in the point of application of this
power, it is no longer the body, with the ritual play of excessive pains,
spectacular brandings in the ritual of the public execution, it is the
mind or rather a play of representations and signs circulating
discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the minds of all” (p. 101).
Affecting the mind of the populace requires changing the souls of
those within society, directing the soul, the prison of the flesh, to
guide behavior along lines dictated by current instances of power.
This focus upon the soul seems most evident in the modern
prison structure. Without observation and control, the entire system
potentially unravels, starting in the prison, which remains a symbol of
the necessity of societal control. Because of this, confinement has
become the punishment of choice and seemingly universal; across
crimes and across places, the carceral (incarceration-as-punishment)
system remains.
The diversity, so solemnly promised, is reduced in the end to this
grey, uniform penalty. Indeed, at the time, there were deputies
who expressed surprise that, instead of establishing a natural
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relation between offences and penalties, a quite different plan
had been adopted: ‘So that if I have betrayed my country, I go
to prison; if I have killed my father, I go to prison; every
imaginable offence is punished in the same uniform way. One
might as well see a physician who has the same remedy for all
ills’ (Chabroud, as cited in Foucault, 1977, p. 74).
Although the carceral system became universal, overriding the
previous diversities of punishment, degrees of incarceration took their
place.
The work of Robert Johnson (1990) addresses punishment of the
soul when he argues that death row is “a modern instance of torture”
(1990, p. 142). The majority of death row prisoners live in supermax
confinement (sometimes called special housing units, administrative
segregation, control units, maxi-maxi, and so on). This existence is far
removed from “ordinary” prison life. It is defined as “free-standing
facilities, or a distinct unit within a facility, that provides for the
management and secure control of inmates who have been officially
designated as exhibiting violent or seriously disruptive behavior while
incarcerated” (NIC, 1997). These facilities are designed to minimize
human contact. Prisoners have no contact with each other and
because of the design of the facilities (podular housing units arranged
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around a central control room) there is minimal contact with staff (who
can observe from a distance, unlike in general population, where they
have to walk up and down the rows to see inside cells). Cells are
usually no bigger than 14’ x 8’ and sometimes smaller. They are
typically furnished with a poured concrete bed, stool (fixed
permanently in place), a steel sink, and an uncovered toilet. Out-of-
cell time is limited, in most cases to one hour a day, and usually spent
in isolation in a small day room within the pod or in an even smaller
outside exercise yard. The flesh remains untouched, for the most part,
in these modern prisons, but the soul is carefully and vitally controlled
through intense confinement.
The justification for such confinement is based largely on the
idea that if “the worst of the worst” can be isolated from the general
prison population, then security can be relaxed to some extent in other
areas of the prison. Additionally, the prison system assumes that extra
confinement equals extra punishment and discipline. (There is little
empirical data to support this contention; see Kurki and Morris, 2001.)
This rationale, however, does not explain why the majority of death
row prisoners are housed in such a way. The findings of the author’s
ongoing research is that death row prisoners are regarded as one of
the least troublesome populations within the prison system, and in
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several jurisdictions they have been successfully integrated into
general population (Lombardi, Sluder and Wallace, 1996). The only
reason the majority of death row inmates is housed in punitive
segregation is the sentence of the court and has absolutely nothing to
do with institutional conduct. Moreover, death-row prisoners, unlike
others in supermax, are unlikely ever to be released and they are not
eligible for progression back into the less punitive regime of general
population. Death-row prisoners are therefore forced to survive their
entire time on death row in conditions which are designed to control
dangerous and recalcitrant prisoners. Because the rationale for
supermax incarceration does not explicitly give a reasonable
explanation of why they should be housed in this way, it is difficult for
these prisoners to come to terms with life in punitive segregation.
When asked to compare psychological suffering caused by solitary
confinement with other physical punishment, Korn and Fox claim it is
“… worse. Physical pain which is definite, which they can control … is
much more bearable than the torment they can neither understand nor
control” (in Jackson, 1983, p. 77).
According to Foucault, the deterrent effect against committing
severe enough offenses to warrant death row blossoms within the
definition of the confinement experience itself:
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If the motive of a crime is the advantage expected of it, the
effectiveness of the penalty is the disadvantage expected of it.
At the heart of punishment is not the actual sensation of pain,
but the idea of pain, displeasure, inconvenience—the ‘pain’ of
the idea of ‘pain’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 94).
On death row, in the severe solitude of supermax, physical pain (in the
form of torture) remains notably absent. Dehumanizing solitude, the
displeasure, discomfort, and inconvenience of it, proves overwhelming
to both the prisoner and the observer. However, the pain remains
invisible to outsiders, behind the eyes of the condemned. The observer
only realizes the pain if he makes eye contact with the prisoner—which
would be a feat indeed, given the solitary conditions of those on
supermax.
As Foucault maintains, the pain is hidden because it targets the
soul, and not the body. Although Foucault was writing before the “rise
and rise of supermax” (King, 1999), he made reference to Jeremy
Bentham’s plan to construct a prison in such a way that an inspector
would be able to see at a glance everything that was taking place, at
the same time concealing the inspector from the observation of
prisoners, “so as to beget the sentiment of an invisible omniscience”
(Atkinson, 1905, p. 84). Bentham’s Panopticon served two political
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purposes: it kept costs down and was also plugged into hegemonic
notions of progress and humanity because people were no longer
beaten—instead, they were gazed at. This gaze, according to Foucault,
served a very vital purpose in the prison: “Above all, no crime
committed must escape the gaze of those whose task it is to dispense
justice. Nothing so weakens the machinery of the law than the hope of
going unpunished” (Foucault, 1997, p. 96). By observing all offenders
at all times in this panoptic structure, no action can hypothetically
escape the omnipresent gaze of power, ready to punish and redirect,
disciplining and punishing the soul to prevent further crime. Bentham’s
plans never came to complete fruition, but have influenced the design
of the modern prison system, especially supermax.
Supermax prisons are typically modern, state-of-the-art facilities
that exercise control by separating bodies. These prisons may be
considered an advancement on the older “big houses,” but conditions
on death row still raise human rights concerns. Bodies are stored in
isolation in modern warehouses until execution with little, if any,
concern for the souls of individuals. The effects of solitary confinement
are painful and have been described as a life that is psychologically
destructive (King et al, 2008). Indeed, many countries refuse to
extradite prisoners to the United States if they are likely to experience
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what has come to be known as the death row phenomenon: inordinate
lengths of time between sentence and execution (on average
exceeding twelve years), the conditions in which the condemned are
held, and the meaning of living under the sentence of death (Smith,
2008). These countries oppose the United States’ use of the death
penalty, but significantly they also express concern about the
conditions of life on its death rows.
It is not difficult to extrapolate a justification of such
dehumanizing punishment from Foucault’s writings. Although Foucault
wrote Discipline and Punish before the rise of the supermax system for
death-row inmates, he noted, “That punishment looks toward the
future, and that at least one of its major functions is to prevent crime
had, for centuries, been one of the current justifications of the right to
punish” (p. 93). In death-row supermax that justification ceases to
exist, and the condemned fall outside of the usual structures of power
and discipline, because they, in essence, have no future. There is
nothing to correct, no teaching of the soul, for the current system of
power seems to assume that the whole being (body and soul) is
eliminated at death. Exacerbating this process is the history of
punishment which still haunts penal institutions despite centuries of
reform. As Foucault notes, historically the nature of the crime had to
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correlate with the nature of the punishment in the eyes of the people.
Additionally, the severity of the crime required a match in severity of
the punishment. In levying a suitable punishment, the sovereign could
conclusively demonstrate his power and mastery over the crime in the
eyes of the populace, and thereby perpetuate his power over them as
well. The control of the criminal demonstrates control over the masses.
In our enlightened age, such sovereign actions seem passé,
fallen out of fashion as we think society has grown away from such
notions. However, on death row the nature of the crime matches the
nature of the punishment, i.e., those on death row are condemned to
die because they killed another, an act that the power structures of
the day deem a “capital offense.” Additionally, the nature of the crime
and the nature of the punishment correlate. The death of the criminal
murderer equals cost of one or more lives within society. Basically,
because the inmate completely dehumanized a member of society
through homicide, he deserves to suffer the ultimate dehumanization
through perpetual solitary confinement until his demise. The system,
in essence, gives up on the condemned, for he is judged beyond the
capacity to reform and to conform.”[T]he sentence that condemns or
acquits is not simply a judgment of guilt, a legal decision that lays
down punishment; it bears with it an assessment of normality and a
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technical prescription for a possible normalization” (p. 20-21). The
judge perceives the offender as beyond the capacity to reform, so he
is removed from those disciplinary structures that cause behavior
change elsewhere in the prison system. Instead, he sits confined and
stored until death, the ultimate non-conformist.
Although in some respects reform touches even these dark
corners of the penitentiary (physical torture remains forbidden), the
history of discipline and punishment remains salient. The death row
phenomenon becomes a part of the eventual execution of the criminal,
slowly strangling the soul, whittling away at being as a prelude to the
extinction of the body. Because they treated others inhumanely, the
implicit message whispers, they deserve inhuman treatment in return.
Indeed, Marat’s injunction “Where punishment is concerned, the
minimum is ordered by humanity and counseled by policy” (as cited in
Foucault, 1977 p. 92) remains ignored and silent in these cloistered
confines.
Coping in Supermax
A Foucaultian perspective allows us to go beyond the classic
studies of prison life such as those of Sykes, Goffman, and Clemmer.
Studies in this genre have their uses in examining the experiences of
those in general prison population, because they focus on the social
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dimensions of prison life. They focus on a prison culture that dictates
forms of adjustment, norms, roles, and groups (McGunigall-Smith and
Johnson, 2008). However, they are of limited, if any, benefit in
explaining patterns of coping for those who are denied access to the
cultural forces of the prison world: death row prisoners in supermax.
Foucaultian theory provides an explanation based on his “internal
analytic of how penal institutions are structured, how they exercise
control and how they are informed by particular forms of knowledge
and technique” (Garland, 1990, p. 132). He examines the power
sustained through “regimes, timetables and strategies of work,
discipline, education, segregative control, and so on” (Sparks, 1996, p.
64).
Central to Foucaultian theory is the concept of the body. The
Classical era “discovered the body as object and target of power,” the
material that is the subject of all political, economic, and penal
institutions (Garland, 1990). It can be trained, without the use of
force, through discipline by constant supervision, which at the end
produces a docile body (Foucault, 1977). Supermax is about the body
being in the right place at the right time. It is about timetables and
regimes. Its purpose is to produce docile bodies and it does so. After
all there is little those in supermax can do to resist its oppressive
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conditions. Escape is extremely unlikely, and the lack of interaction
provides no opportunity for physical venting—in the form of assaults,
for instance.
Furthermore, all prisoners are under the panoptic gaze of staff at
any given time. This description may give rise to a mental image of
robotic prisoners simply existing under the normalizing gaze of the
prison. The slightest infraction of rules results in write-ups, which
result in more stringent confinement. Foucault reminds us that
normalization has its own rules which extend beyond the sentence of
the court, rules which he refers to as “infra-penalty” and which coerce
the individual into conformity. Conformity is also brought about by
self-policing; knowing they are being watched, or at least likely to be,
causes prisoners to assume “responsibility for the constraint of power”
(Foucault, 1977, p. 201).
One of the death-row prisoners in this study provided an
example of the effects of self-policing:
Paul: On one occasion the officers had forgotten to restrain
me. I felt like a normal person. But I felt really
uncomfortable and was aware that others were feeling
uncomfortable too. I don’t want others to feel this way. It
had a psychological effect on me. These people believe I
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should be restrained to such an extent that I believed it too
for a moment. I don’t want them to believe it. I’m damned if
I want me to believe it too. (McGunigall-Smith, 2004, p.
117)
Paul is clearly expressing awareness of and responsibility for his own
being, indicating he experiences himself as an agent. A criticism often
leveled at Foucault’s work is that he ignores agency. On one hand, as
Giddens claims, Foucault provides “little theoretical reason to
anticipate resistance subversion or innovation” (from Sparks, 1996, p.
67, italics in original); on the other hand, Garland suggests that if
Foucault had studied more closely the nature of resistance,
He might have described the operation of power upon individuals
as being less of an ‘automatic’ process and more a matter of
micro-political conflict in which the individual/subject may draw
upon alternative sources of power and subjectivity to resist that
imposed by the institution (1990, p. 173).
We hold that Foucault did not extensively discuss the role of agency,
but he did assume agency in the processes of change and reform in
the prison system and structure. Indeed, people can choose to
conform under the power of the panoptic gaze, or they may chose not
to conform, and suffer the consequences. The issue of agency is
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important because a finding of this research is that the death-row
prisoners were not simply docile bodies. They exercised an alternative
source of power, although not in an obvious way, by “tripping.”
Tripping Out of the Confines
Several death-row prisoners described this coping technique to
the primary author very early in the fieldwork. The primary author
asked a simple question: “How do you cope?” Cody, one of the
participants, gave this response:
I manage some of my time by tripping—walking up and
down my cell for hours—anything between two and four
hours. I would go nuts if I didn’t do this because it’s like . . .
when I do this my mind is in other places. For example, I go
to the mountains, lakes, go hunting—mainly places I have
been to before. When I do this I am not in prison
(McGunigall-Smith, 2004, p. 119).
During a further round of interviews all respondents mentioned this
technique. Paul, a prisoner who, at that time, had been on death row
for over twelve years, commented:
I walk up and down my cell a lot day dreaming . . . I do this
mostly at night when it is quiet . . . the slightest noise can
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology McGunigall-Smith, Draper,
2010, Vol 2(1), 104-136 Birmingham, Durtschi
“Tripping” on Death Row
22
bring me back. I trip on places I remember and add to it
with my imagination (p. 120).
He went on:
I was in prison for about two or three years before I realized
this could be done—throwing your mind somewhere else. I
saw someone pacing and I told them it must be boring—he
said it was better than doing nothing, so I tried it. Each
inmate has his own way of doing it and the amount of time
varies. I do it at night when there is less noise, although I
do it in the daytime sometimes. It is important just to get
away. You can’t ever get away from the pressure—the
pressure is still there when you get back. Perhaps pressure
is the wrong word—monotony might be better (p. 120).
Tripping is more than daydreaming, it is a deliberate,
learned coping skill evidenced by the remarks of two more death-
row prisoners:
Keith: It took me five or six years to learn how to do this . .
. it is about deliberate thoughts and channeled thoughts.
Power is lost if you let your mind wander. I trip for anything
between one and four hours. It is necessary for me to do
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this during the day—in this way I can have social interaction
with family and friends (p. 120).
Michael: You have to learn how to do this. It took me a
couple of years.
At a time during the fieldwork when prisoners were allowed out
of their cells two at a time for two hours, veterans taught the
technique to a newcomer to death row:
Harris: One of the guys was trying to teach me to put my
mind somewhere else . . . I pace at night. Paul told me that.
He said when it’s quiet to walk back and forth. I did it the
first night and I thought what the heck am I doing? I’m
walking and not getting anywhere. Where am I going? I sat
down. The next night I caught myself doing it—walking back
and forth. Last night I told myself this is stupid. But,
anything to take my mind off this place (p. 199).
It seemed that once an individual masters the technique, the effects
are profound. There is also a control element in that the “tripper” often
makes quite elaborate plans. He decides beforehand, for instance,
where he will go, who his companions will be, and what brand of beer
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he will take. He asserts power over himself, his destination, and even
his companions.
Cody: I was at Lake Powell before I came to the interview—I
had a good time and had a few beers . . . sometimes I go
back and do what I’ve done before. I go to my dad’s cabin,
cut some firewood, have a couple of beers with him out on
the deck. I didn’t do this in [general] population—I was
totally occupied . . . tripping keeps me sane and keeps me
happy. . . . It’s hard to trip when I’m angry—it’s hard to go
and hard to stay and it’s frustrating because I keep coming
back. On a normal day it’s easy for me to go. Bad news
makes it harder. I usually take a friend with me (p. 121).
The prisoner, when tripping, is transported in his mind to a social
world he has left behind and can enjoy moments free of the stresses of
life in supermax (McGunigall-Smith and Johnson, 2008). All death row
subjects in the fieldwork used this form of coping, a concept that has
been accurately described as an escape from death row (McGunigall-
Smith and Johnson, 2008).
When asked when they started to use this technique to
escape, five death-row prisoners said they used it since their
incarceration in supermax while under the sentence of death. Only
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one differed in that he tripped wherever he was in the prison,
regardless of the regime, although he had spent most of his
prison time in maximum security or supermax. However, six
prisoners serving life sentences also tripped. One was in
maximum security, four were in medium security, and one was in
minimum security (he went to school, had a job, and lived in a
dormitory). Two who did not trip at the time of interview said they
did so only when in maximum security. Five prisoners serving life
sentences had yet to progress out of maximum security and had
served between 3 and 5 years in prison, yet they did not trip.
There is no obvious causal relationship between tripping and
sentence of the court, or the type of housing.
Foucault and Tripping
As we mentioned earlier, some of Foucault’s critics claim
that he did not allow for agency. We hold, contrarily, that he
assumed agency instead, and indeed, the entire system of
discipline and punishment exists to redirect, discipline, teach, or
bring the criminal offender into conformity. When considering the
death-row experience, however, we find that those offenders
restlessly sit outside of the discipline structure. Their existence is
punishment, and they exist in the shadow of the ultimate
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punishment (death). These prisoners in the most radically
segregated and separated instance of modern American prisons
suffer extraordinary levels of stress as a result of the
dehumanizing conditions of supermax confinement. Their agency,
however, remains very much intact. Tripping can be a way of
experiencing what Johnson considers “essential to all humans, a
sense of self determination,” their agentic act to direct their own
lives as much as possible in such limited settings (1995, p. 121).
The soul still exercises its will-to-power even within the
claustrophobic cells of those on death row, and abandons the
body it has imprisoned for so long, escaping and controlling its
own experience as the body remains under the panoptic gaze of
the system. Furthermore, a survivor of Buchenwald and Dachau,
Bruno Bettelheim, claimed self-determination (agency) finds
expression in some degree of autonomy, "man’s ability to regulate
his own life” (Todorov, 1996, p. 61). Regardless of how carefully
or harshly the body is contained or controlled, the agency—the
soul and will of the person—remains intact, with the power to
regulate their own thinking and their own psychological
experience.
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When death-row prisoners trip, they are doing precisely
this. They take hold upon those inner resources of power to resist
or at least cope with the dehumanizing conditions of life under the
sentence of death in a supermax facility. Their bodies may be
docile, but their souls are exercising power to survive in the
austere panoptic regime of supermax confinement.
As we discussed previously, the panopticon serves as a
controlling and disciplinary force in the lives of all citizens (but
particularly of offenders). In fact, the gaze itself held power, and
to be gazed upon was to have power exercised upon one. To be
seen, in essence, is to be controlled. The inherent issue in this
process is that the soul remains invisible to the all-observer, and
hence the gaze has no power over that which it cannot see. The
observer can only control the body, the observable element. One
implication that arises from Foucault’s insight about observation
creating docile bodies and assumedly conforming souls, is that it
only works to a certain extent. The observed body is controlled by
a soul which may draw upon inner resources to refuse to conform,
or to formulate its own understanding of the punishment. The
incarcerated men we interviewed created their own meaning and
understanding from the experience of their extreme incarceration,
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and they escaped from the experience by tripping. Consequently,
the panoptic gaze failed in their cases, for the panoptic gaze seeks
to bring about the conformity of those it observes, but it cannot
reach their souls, the very aspect of them it seeks to control and
cause to conform.
Indeed, the offenders possessing what Foucault termed
infra-power teach one another to “escape” their confines, their
power operating contrary to the conformity the gaze desires. The
incarcerated men, in essence, find that such incarceration may be
radically dis-empowering, but by the same token find a new
source of empowerment in the face of it, a power within they did
not know they had, the capacity of their souls to escape.
Panopticon, in essence, fails to exercise complete control, for it is
the soul that can take up power from different sources, especially
internal ones, even in the face of observation. The system fails to
make invisible souls as docile as the bodies visible to the all-
seeing eye. The implication of this seems troubling, because in
Foucault’s view, it is the soul that imprisons the flesh, and if the
panoptic system of observation and discipline fails to control the
soul, ultimately the system fails to control the criminal. It is not a
surprise then, that recidivism rates for many offenses are quite
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology McGunigall-Smith, Draper,
2010, Vol 2(1), 104-136 Birmingham, Durtschi
“Tripping” on Death Row
29
high (but, predictably, not for capital offenses) (Zamble &
Quinsey, 2001).
Another implication of the death-row experience from a
Foucaultian perspective is that as the system of discipline and
punishment moved away from the excruciation of the body to
control of the soul, it did so with the goal of embracing or
acknowledging the humanity of the offender. Power existed to
prompt conformity, not vengeance; safety for the public, not just
despair for the criminal. However, the system de-humanizes those
with a death sentence, housing them away from even other
offenders within the system, as if the system needs to also protect
itself from acknowledging the humanity of these offenders. As the
monarchs of old discovered, once the public confronts the
humanity of the condemned, the condemned gains power through
others’ feeling of shared humanity. Those who have met the gaze
of the condemned feel the connection, the mutual humanity.
Consequently, they will cry for the reform of the death-row
experience, because even though the condemned is convicted due
to his inhuman treatment of others, his own humanity remains
undeniable. In order for the system to persist, therefore, those in
Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology McGunigall-Smith, Draper,
2010, Vol 2(1), 104-136 Birmingham, Durtschi
“Tripping” on Death Row
30
power must minimize the contact of those on death row from
others, both within and without the prison.
Conclusion
Foucault offers one interpretation of the development of the
modern prison system. Although he died before the
implementation of supermax, we conjecture that supermax is an
extreme form of the carceral process, the efforts of the reformers
through the enlightenment and into modernity to “punish better.”
One primary method of control in this “better” system is the
panoptic gaze, which asserts power over the body through
observation. We argue, however, that the soul, the “prison” of the
flesh, cannot be observed. The soul, in fact, has the capacity to
escape from the confines of supermax via “tripping,” the act of
self-hypnotically escaping from the cell into a far more pleasant
world accessible through memory and imagination. The offenders
take up power they find internally, in the face of, and against, the
panoptic gaze of the system. Additionally, the system maintains
the condemned away from outside observation, perhaps for its
own sake, because if outsiders experienced the humanity of the
condemned, the entire system would need to change.
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